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Cyberspace and Time: A Light through the Fog?
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Rémi GÉRAUD
ABSTRACT
One usually describes cyberspace as a virtual realm. In truth, it is grounded in real infrastruc-
tures, which therefore inherit local regulations and broader geopolitical influences from the 
location where they are set up. The consequences of this attachment to a place can be meas-
ured to some extent from the communications happening in cyberspace, i.e., through commu-
nication networks. But there is also a temporal anchorage resulting from phenomena such 
as synchronisation in communications which, when analysed, reveals deep and surprising 
proximities, shedding new light on the relationships between actors in cyberspace. We discuss 
in particular how an analysis of synchronicity in cyberspace helped to identify collusions and 
a diffusion network active in spreading radical messages, as well as providing insight in these 
groups’ internal structure.
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RÉSUMÉ
Le cyberespace constitue un domaine généralement décrit comme virtuel. Mais il est bâti en 
réalité sur des infrastructures tout à fait existantes, qui sont dès lors sujettes aux législations 
territoriales, et aux influences géopolitiques héritées des lieux où elles sont installées. Cet 
ancrage terrestre laisse des traces, mesurables, dans les échanges qui se tiennent dans le 
cyberespace, via les réseaux de télécommunication. Mais il y a également un ancrage dans 
le temps, réalisé par exemple par la synchronicité des échanges, et qui révèle des proximi-
tés d’une autre nature, éclairant les relations entre acteurs du cyberespace selon un angle 
nouveau. En particulier, nous illustrons comment une étude du temps dans le cyberespace 
a permis d’identifier des collusions à large échelle dans la diffusion de messages à contenu 
radical, et la structure des groupes de diffusion.
MOTS CLÉS
Sciences du territoire, cyberespace, internet, synchronicité, mathématiques
INTRODUCTION
The fabric of cyberspace is woven from telecommunication channels. Over these channels, 
information is created, transported, transformed, and exchanged; but these channels are 
drawn between concrete devices and infrastructures: this makes them objects of real geopolit-
ical interest. Indeed these infrastructures are bound to undergo various cultural, political, and 
socio-economic pressures, which therefore bear in some way on any network in which they 
participate (Douzet et al., 2014).
One may thus wonder to what extent it is possible to recognise or identify such influences, 
mapping similarities or dissimilarities, by participating in a communication network. Indeed, the 
network itself introduces additional information along with the mere messages it transports; 
for instance: routing and addressing protocols (BGP, ARP...) used by the different devices in 
the network to organise themselves, regulate traffic, avoid congestion, and other such tasks; 
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incomplete or partial messages, echoes, resulting from, e.g., some defective piece of equip-
ment; and side channel information, that can be measured from the network but is not explicitly 
transported over it, such as latency, packet drop, or timing correlations.
In this work, we discuss how to capture and leverage timing information on a public network to 
define a first notion of synchronicity, and form rough communities based on activity patterns; 
we then refine this analysis to identify message diffusion patterns (causal avalanches). Finally, 
we use network latency estimates to identify automated posters on the public network, and 
show that they are likely to be operated by few entities.
All in all, we provide a framework and tools to detect non-local collusions, which may be attrib-
uted to forethought, automation, or hidden communication channels not immediately acces-
sible to the analyst, but visible through their effects –all three possibilities being relevant to a 
thorough understanding of cyberspace.
1. WHY TIME MATTERS
1.1. The network fog of war
Computer networks are built atop infrastructures that belong to the physical world, where 
cyberspace collides with geographic space. Because of this, key assets (datacenters, largest 
network routes, etc.) can be mapped, to some extent, using traditional means, and lend them-
selves to an extended geopolitical analysis (Douzet et al., 2014; Limonier, 2014). The result-
ing cartography is still in its infancy, although it shows beyond doubt that some states have 
already embraced cyberwarfare as part of their doctrine.
However, building (and concealing) new infrastructures is a long and costly process. While 
this is compatible with some objectives, e.g. controlling data routes or storage, it constitutes 
too much of a risk of being exposed in sensitive operations, such as influence campaigns or 
massive distributed denial of service attacks. This does not mean that state actors refrain from 
engaging in such operations; but they need plausible deniability.
To that end, they can leverage the absence of integrity and authenticity guarantees offered by 
computer networks, in particular Internet1. Indeed, attackers can send crafted packets having 
wrong sender information (which is one way to launch DDoS attacks), or hide behind interme-
diation platforms such as social media websites. As a result, attack attribution is made very 
difficult, and identifying the attack’s precise source is close to impossible. This is a famous 
issue in the context of network security, which ridicules attempts at automatically retaliating 
in name of “active defence” strategies, lest some additional information is known from e.g. 
intelligence sources that the attack indeed originated from the claimed source. Thus, attackers 
can craft data to hide their position, number, and possibly any sensitive information, thereby 
providing strong deniability guarantees.
What we suggest in this note is that the immediacy of computer network communications, 
made sharper by technological evolution, provides the analyst with new means to measure 
“closeness” or “similarity” beyond geographical vicinity, and complementary to it.
1 By “Internet” we really mean the Internet protocol (IP), and its two most used super-layers: the 
transport control protocol (TCP/IP) and the user datagram protocol (UDP/IP). Together they account for 
the entirety of the traffic to web pages and to more than 80% of all traffic worldwide.
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From a theoretical standpoint, we hope to extend the toolkit available for researchers and 
actors to analyse abstract networks (and in particular communication networks), aiming at 
extending the classical cartographic approach to the virtual world.
1.2. Synchronicity, causality, sychnometry
This “geography of time” is not a mere accident of the network’s internals, but reveals underly-
ing structures, and to a degree, causal influence between actors. As such it provides a better 
understanding of event dynamics in cyberspace, and gives additional insight into the geopolit-
ical approaches of cyber actors.
We define this notion of time vicinity using the mathematical notion of stochastic processes, 
which give a precise meaning to “random” events occurring over time, and give means to 
measure their statistical dependence. There could be many ways in which two events influ-
ence one another; we focus on two of them: excitation and repetition. Excitation means that 
a certain class of events suddenly becomes much more probable; informally, this captures 
synchronicity between events (including runaway phenomena). Repetition means that the 
occurrence of an event strongly correlates to the occurrence of the same event at some later 
time; we refer to this analysis as sychnometry2.
It is a basic fact that statistical correlation usually does not imply causation, and thus we shall 
refrain from making such a confusion. However, under some hypotheses, we can make an 
educated guess about the causal structure of events. For instance, if event A happens before 
event B for all observers, then B is unlikely to be the cause of A. Alternatively, if we observe that 
causation typically happens over a short period of time (e.g., days), but A and B are separated 
by a too short (e.g., millisecond) or too long (e.g., months) amount of time, then it is unlikely 
that they are causally (directly) related. Mathematically, we model the phenomena of interest 
as Hawkes processes (Bacry et al., 2015), fitted using Maximum Likelihood estimation; from 
this we can extract synchronicity and sychnometric information efficiently, and to some extent 
reconstruct the (early) causal structure of events. We shall insist, here and later, that this is only 
causality in a probabilistic sense, and therefore may return wrong results (as any other tool).
The results of this analysis on a concrete case are given in section 3 below, after some tech-
nical preliminaries and methodological care. The context of heated debate over cyberspace 
territoriality and sovereignty is paramount to understand our motivations; we expect that 
the approach highlighted here participates in mending the disconnect between “virtual” and 
“concrete” geopolitics.
Our focus is on communication networks in general, of which social networks are an example 
and provide an interesting source, as they happen to be central hubs of influence for geopo-
litical questions.
2. MEASURING TIME OVER THE INTERNET
2.1. Defining and measuring network latency
Over the Internet, data is grouped into “packets” before transmission, that are transported 
from network device to network device until their destination is reached, or the packet is lost or 
2 From Greek “συχνός”, which means “frequent, repeated”.
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corrupted to the point that transport is no longer relevant. In theory, packets are forwarded by 
intermediate network nodes asynchronously (first-in, first-out), which results in a processing 
delay, a transmission delay (pushing the packet’s bits onto the link), and a propagation delay, 
i.e., the time taken for a signal to reach its destination.
In reality, additional mechanisms are used to shape traffic, guarantee delivery or fairness 
between users (e.g., “quality of service” mechanisms), and the physical medium’s limitations 
must be taken into account (e.g., in wireless networks). All of these result in varying queuing 
delays that add to the full transmission time (Nygren et al., 2010).
The round-trip delay time (RTT) accounts for all the above effects and measures the time taken 
between the moment a message is sent and the moment it is fully echoed back. However, the 
RTT does not discriminate between forward (from sender to recipient) and backward (from 
recipient back to sender) delays. A more robust approach is to use active measurements, 
for instance with the minimum-pairs algorithm (Abdou et al., 2015), which requires the use 
of three trusted and synchronised nodes to reliably measure the one-way latency to a fourth 
(not necessarily trusted) node. Alternative methods are possible but typically less reliable 
(Gummadi et al., 2002).
Note that any measurement performed on a remote device will necessarily be stained by some 
latency (this is akin to the situation in astrophysics, as one observes a remote star). This has 
to be corrected, and can be to some degree, as we now explain.
2.2. Time-of-flight measurements and relative positioning
Informally, the more intermediate nodes a packet has to go through, the longer the delay. By 
probing several well-positioned nodes on the network we can therefore infer how “far away” 
they are in terms of network hops, and to some extent reconstruct the underlying “informa-
tional highways”, even if they are invisible from available (meta)data.
Representing this information is highly non-trivial however, as latency measurements aggre-
gate several independent delay sources, and vary over repeated experiments. Nevertheless, 
large trends are visible and this average “time-of-flight” already highlights privileged or 
hampered routes. In particular we are interested in the latency distribution, which contains 
information about typical delays and variations (fig. 1)3.
Figure 1. Latency distribution to a Twitter CDN node. Horizontal scale is in milliseconds
3 Time measurements are precise to the millisecond; variations are not due to any “measurement error” 
but to the superposition of various networks mechanisms delaying packet transmission.
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2.3. Trusted time reference
In some situations we can have a public and trusted time reference. To that end we synchro-
nise with GPS time (Lombardi et al., 2001) and measure latency distribution from a fixed point 
to a given public server. In our case, the public server will be one of Twitter’s CDN nodes. 
This allows us to measure the time elapsed between the moment a message is sent to the 
Twitter platform and the value indicated by the timestamp appearing on the platform when that 
message has been received. By monitoring the public API, we therefore get precise timings 
of when we received notification of the message, when the notification was sent (corrected 
by subtracting the one-way delay estimation from the server to our device), and when the 
message was acknowledged on the Twitter platform (as per the API-provided timestamp). 
Comparing these timings shows that we get a reasonably precise estimate of when the 
message is received by Twitter, and we will henceforth proceed using this information.
Using a trusted time reference, we can monitor events, record information, and order events 
in an unambiguous way. This was done for Twitter data over the course of several months. We 
can then use the tools described in section 1, which gives the results described below.
3. SYNCHRONICITY PATTERNS AND NON-LOCAL COLLUSIONS
3.1. Synchronicity measures: Multi-scale visualisation of influence
On figure 2, we represent the synchronicity/excitation measures extracted from retweet activ-
ity based on our captured data. A striking observation is that there is a regular pattern of 
activity strongly aligned with a given time zone (despite users declaring various time zones), 
which is observed independently from the message content. These graphs show, for instance, 
that a message is more likely to be retweeted 24 hours after the initial post, than 12 hours 
after. The near linear (rather than exponential) decay in synchronicity may be interpreted as 
the manifestation of a causal avalanche: a first set of users propagate the message over the 
next day, then another set of users (following roughly the same activity pattern) propagate the 
message over the next day, etc. Such a scenario can be simulated and exhibits a similar linear 
decay in synchronicity. However this information alone is not sufficient to guarantee that what 
is observed actually follows a propagation avalanche.
Figure 2. Synchronicity measures for retweets over the course of 3 days (left) and two weeks (right)
Vertical red lines indicate 24-hour periods. This graph shows strong correlations with the day-night cycle  
corresponding to a geographic time zone, a near-linear decrease in synchronicity over time.  
Horizontal scale is in seconds from a reference point, as explained in section 2
Identifying the peaks in figure 2 is easily done algorithmically as it corresponds to values 
where the first derivative vanishes and the second derivative is negative. We should insist 
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here that figure 2 is obtained without any smoothing and is the direct result of synchronicity 
measures over aggregated data, which shows how very clear and reliable activity patterns 
can be identified.
Limiting ourselves to the first minutes of diffusion, synchronicity measures provide a representa-
tion of how information propagates across the network, from neighbour to neighbour (fig. 3).
Figure 3. Synchronicity measures, capped to 3 minutes,  
mapped as relationships between nodes on a portion of the Twitter network
Two nodes in this graph are linked when they typically react within 3 minutes of one another
Synchronicity can be observed at several scales, and we have very good temporal resolution 
(1 ms). This gives a multi-scale picture of influence in the network, complemented by other 
community measures (e.g., network centrality).
3.2. Sychnometry measures: Visualising collusions
Our other measure focuses on repetition in activity, even when there is no link between two 
users (i.e., they do not interact). Following probability theory, we should expect a uniform 
(“flat”) distribution for synchrometric estimates when all the nodes behave independently. As 
we saw on the synchronicity measures, there is latent variable in the form of a day-night cycle 
that must be accounted for. But in fact, when we turn our attention to very short time spans 
(where the day-night cycle’s influence is negligible), and a portion of the network known to 
contain radical messages, we obtain figure 4.
What is visible on this figure is the presence of highly coordinated actors: actors that post at 
different moments of the day, and do not interact with one another, but do so “similarly’. They 
would not be otherwise visible! This is remarkable not only because of this sudden break 
through the mist, but because the sychnometric patterns appear extremely thin. Concretely, 
this means that groups of posters follow the exact same pattern within less than a second. 
They can be automatically identified using classical outlier detection techniques. Our inter-
pretation is that this can only be done if these groups of posters are controlled by very few 
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individuals (“senders”). Indeed it is extremely unlikely (under one chance in a billion) that such 
correlations are due to chance.
Figure 4. Sychnometric estimates for a period of 800 seconds on a portion of the network
Thin peaks, indicated by red vertical lines, are separated by 2 minutes (120 seconds). Broader peaks,  
indicated by blue vertical lines, are separated by 3 minutes
Based on earlier estimates on latency distribution to Twitter’s CDN nodes, we can see that all 
the 2-minute peaks originate from a single sender (using several dozen accounts), and all the 
3-minute peaks originate from two, slightly distant senders (again using many accounts). We 
shall call members of such collusions seeds.
From a network point of view, each seed is the centre of a user community, and typically two 
such communities are fairly distant. But the operators planting seeds across the network have 
tight control over the content and can efficiently give the impression that some information is 
true because diffusion patterns ensure a quick propagation. After a few minutes, several a 
priori independent sources convey this message.
The amount of precision required to operate all seeds is compatible with the use of dedicated 
computer programs (such wide-scale coordination at the sub-second level is very unlikely 
to be a manual labour); however the choice of placement and the contents are engineered 
strategically.
4. CONCLUSION AND FURTHER WORK
4.1. On the importance of being timely
This study shows how to leverage timing measurements to extract hitherto hidden information 
about a network’s operation, highlighting the structure of influence operations and calling for an 
integration of related measures in the representations of cyberspace. The extremely precise 
and abundant availability of time measurements makes it a reliable and efficient material.
4.2. Exploiting latent linguistic information
The same observations made for networks and network protocols hold for messages them-
selves, when they are exchanged between communities. To make the message understand-
able to its intended recipients, users have to convene of some format, which forces them 
to abide to some rules (grammatical or other); some users are less literate than others; 
messages have a given length, are typed at a certain speed, etc. In a sense, there is linguistic 
metadata readily available. In a network context, it is not possible to correctly participate in a 
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communication without giving some reasonable accurate information, such as an IP address 
to establish a TCP connection; likewise participants in a conversation will leak some details 
about them or relations between them.
These two approaches –leveraging network and linguistic metadata– combine naturally and 
provide insights about how communities are formed; notions of network and linguistic central-
ity shed light on how a network operates and which elements hold influence over which others.
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